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A Minnesota statute allows taxpayers, in computing their state
income tax, to deduct expenses incurred in the education of their
children.' These expenses include tuition, textbooks, and transpor-
tation costs, and are available to parents of all elementary or sec-
ondary school students. A group of Minnesota taxpayers brought
suit in federal district court against the Minnesota Commissioner
of Revenue and against parents who had taken deductions for ex-
penses incurred in sending their children to parochial schools. The
taxpayers claimed that the statute violated the establishment
clause of the first amendment by providing assistance to sectarian
institutions. The district court granted summary judgment for the
commissioner,2 holding that the statute did not have the primary
effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed; it held that the statute was neutral on
its face and in its application. On certiorari the Supreme Court of
the United States affirmed and held: A state statute that provides
tax deductions for tuition, textbooks, and transportation expenses
incurred by parents of school children who attend public or non-
public schools does not violate the establishment clause of the first
amendment. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
I. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court of the United States has promulgated a
1. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.089 (West Supp. 1982) (the deduction cannot exceed $500 for
each dependent in elementary school and $700 for each dependent in grades 7-12).
2. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir.
1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
3. 676 F.2d 1195 (1982).
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three-part test to determine the validity of a statute under the es-
tablishment clause. A federal or state statute granting aid to a sec-
tarian institution is constitutional if (1) it has a secular legislative
purpose; (2) it does not have the primary effect of either advancing
or inhibiting religion; and (3) it does not lead to excessive entan-
glement between church and state.4 The Court developed this test
in a series of decisions examining government aid to religious insti-
tutions, thereby creating numerous precedents demarcating the pa-
rameters of permissible church and state contacts.5
The first amendment to the United States Constitution states
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." These words
were drafted in an era taut with religious tension; they reflected
the fears of an emerging nation preoccupied with the abridgement
of individual freedoms.7 The establishment clause embodied the
hope that religion would be left to the dictates of the individual's
conscience, and not be proscribed or determined by the whims of a
sovereign. e It also reflected Thomas Jefferson's hope that a wall of
separation between church and state would assure an enduring
4. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
5. The complexity of the constitutional problems that church and state relations raise,
coupled with the recognition that parents have the right to send their children to parochial
schools, forced the Court into a series of decisions that seem to have little or no relation to
each other. As one commentator described:
Since 1947, the Supreme Court has upheld the following state aid programs for
elementary and secondary nonpublic schools: reimbursing the cost of transporta-
tion to and from public and nonpublic schools; lending students secular, non-
ideological textbooks; providing diagnostic, therapeutic, and remedial services;
and reimbursing schools for carrying out state-mandated testing and scoring. At
the same time, the Court has struck down aid programs covering field trip trans-
portation; salaries for parochial school teachers; maintenance and repair costs;
instructional equipment, supplies, and materials; and some forms of tuition
benefits.
Note, Laws Respecting an Establishment of Religion: An Inquiry into Tuition Tax Bene-
fits, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 210 (1983). For a discussion of various precedents highlighting
the development of establishment clause analysis, see infra notes 10-43 and accompanying
text.
6. U.S. CONST. amend I.
7. The Supreme Court acknowledged, in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947),
the environment of fear and apprehension pervasive among the drafters of the Constitution:
"These words of the First Amendment reflected in the minds of early Americans a vivid
mental picture of conditions and practices which they fervently wished to stamp out in
order to preserve liberty for themselves and their posterity." Everson, 330 U.S. at 8.
8. See Hunter, The Continuing Debate Over Tuition Tax Credits, 7 HASTINGS CONST.





The first establishment clause challenge to a state statute pro-
viding aid to a sectarian institution came before the Supreme
Court in 1947, in the case of Everson v. Board of Education.0 A
New Jersey statute authorized the provision of funds for the trans-
portation of children to educational institutions, including secta-
rian private schools." The Supreme Court ruled that a state could
provide aid to a nonpublic institution if the aid promoted the gen-
eral welfare and was neutral. 2 The majority emphasized that the
nation was no longer fraught with the fear of state religion or with
a sovereign's proscription or inhibition of the free expression of an
individual's conscience." The Court developed the secular legisla-
tive intent test and ruled that the purpose of the New Jersey stat-
ute was to extend welfare benefits to all children.14 The majority
emphasized that the wall of separation between church and state
must always be an impregnable barrier, one which does not allow
even the most innocuous breach.' 5
During the next sixteen years the Court applied the secular
purpose test to numerous state statutes. 6 Both opponents and
9. The concept of a wall separating church and state was first articulated in a letter
written by Thomas Jefferson in 1802 to the Dansbury Baptist Association. Jefferson used
the wall metaphor in a philosophical argument in which he concluded that government
could not reach the opinions of men, and in which he argued for a separation between secu-
lar and religious entities. See Hutchins, The Future of the Wall, in THE WALL BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE 17 (D. Oaks ed. 1963).
10. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
11. The township of Ewing instituted a program pursuant to the statute wherein the
town reimbursed funds that parents expended for the transportation of their children to
and from school. The aid applied to fares paid for transportation by public carrier and was
extended to parents of parochial school students.
12. The Court stated that the first amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to
be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to
favor them." Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
13. See id. at 8.
14. The Court compared the provision of public aid for transportation expenses to the
provision of state-paid policemen. It stated that in both cases the state was advancing the
welfare of children. "[The] legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general pro-
gram to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously
to and from accredited schools." Id. at 18.
15. The Court stated: "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and
state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest
breach." Id.
16. During these years the Court did not examine the issue of public aid to religious
institutions. Instead, it focused on activities prevalent in the classrooms. The most cele-
brated cases during this period dealt with prayers in public schools. See, e.g., Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (discussing state statute forbidding the teaching of evolution);
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proponents of religious education sought to test the limits of the
Court's secular purpose analysis by challenging statutes prefaced
by statements of legitimate secular intent. The Supreme Court
faced the undesirable chore of judging not only the purpose of
state statutes but also the sincerity of state legislatures, thus
straining the Court's natural distaste for impugning the motives of
legislators. As a result, the Court developed the primary effects
test.
The primary effects test states that a statute cannot have the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.17 In Board of
Education v. Allen,"5 the Court upheld a statute providing for the
loan of textbooks free of charge to public and nonpublic school
students. 9 The Court noted that the benefits offered were based
neither on religious criteria nor provided aid directly to the
schools. 20 The majority also emphasized that the books advanced
secular education and held that the statute did not have the pri-
mary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.2 The Court's anal-
ysis no longer focused exclusively on the legislative intent but
rather shifted to an examination of the application of the statute.22
The Court was concerned with the scope of the class of benefi-
ciaries as well as with the nature of the aid.23
The Supreme Court, after validating the Allen statute, began
to waiver as it saw the erosion of Jefferson's metaphoric wall. In
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (voiding Bible readings in public
schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (voiding the recitation of an official prayer to
begin the school day); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (discussing Sunday clos-
ing laws). See generally F. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION (1976) (discussing the series of
cases that followed Everson).
17. See Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975).
18. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
19. New York's Education Law required local school authorities to lend textbooks free
of charge to all students in grades seven to twelve. This program was extended to students
in both public and nonpublic schools. Before the enactment of the statute, public school
boards designated the textbooks to be used in public schools. They then purchased the
books with public funds and rented them or resold them to public school students. The
legislature amended this statute after taking notice of the public welfare and safety require-
ments of the state and of the role that education plays in the furtherance of such goals. See
id. at 238-39.
20. Id. at 244. The Court noted that the contents of a textbook could be readily ascer-
tained by government officials. Id. at 245.
21. Id. at 251. Justice Black, dissenting, argued that the New York statute created im-
permissible contacts between church and state. He feared that sectarian propagandists
would try to assert their own political tenets and cause political bitterness and division. See
id. at 250 (Black, J., dissenting).




Walz v. Tax Commission,2 ' the Court held that a statute granting
property tax exemptions to religious organizations was constitu-
tional, ruling that tax exemptions were consistent with the estab-
lishment clause and were supported by a long history of implemen-
tations.2 Although the decision upheld the exemption statute, it
broke new ground in the analysis of the establishment clause. The
Court analyzed the statute without relying on either the purpose
test or the primary effects test.20 Instead, it examined the resulting
contacts between church and state, and developed the excessive
entanglement test.
27
The Court ruled that a statute or its application must not lead
to excessive contacts between church and state, and noted that
such contacts are precisely the evil feared by the drafters of the
first amendment. 2 Although Walz was a triumph for the propo-
24. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
25. Chief Justice Burger noted that "an unbroken practice of according the exemption
to churches, openly and by affirmative state action, not covertly and by state inaction, is not
something to be lightly cast aside." Id. at 678. Such a history of implementation acts in the
manner of an experiment, allowing the Court to project past results into a prediction of
future effects. The Court is showing deference to tradition while continuing to emphasize an
analysis of the primary effects that results from the application of the statute. As the Chief
Justice said:
Nothing in this national attitude towards religious tolerance and two centuries
of uninterrupted freedom from taxation has given the remotest sign of leading to
an established church or religion and on the contrary it has operated affirma-
tively to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief. Thus, it
is hardly useful to suggest that tax exemption is but the "foot in the door" or
the "nose of the camel in the tent" leading to an established church.
Id.
26. Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.
27. The development of the excessive entanglement test signaled a new, more restric-
tive approach to the inquiry into church and state issues. It was an affirmation that the
Court had broken sharply with its practice of evaluating legislative purpose and intent. The
Court examined the tradition, history, and purpose of tax exemptions. But it did not engage
in this examination in order to show deference to tradition and legislative purpose; it did so
in order to examine the effects emanating from the application of the statute. See supra
note 25 and accompanying text. The excessive entanglement test was another attempt to
delve into the actual effects emanating from the application of the statute. See, e.g., Hunter,
supra note 8, at 532.
The Court, in articulating the excessive entanglement test, emphasized that the test
was a further application of its inquiry into the effects of a statute. "Determining that the
legislative purpose of tax exemptions is not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting
religion does not end the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that the end result-the
effect-is n-ot an excessive government entanglement with religion." Waiz, 397 U.S. at 674.
28. Id. at 674. In analyzing a statute under the third prong of the establishment clause
test, a court must balance the resulting church and state contacts with the contacts present
in the absence of the statute. The Walz majority illustrated this principle:
The test is inescapably one of degree. Either course, taxation of churches or ex-
emption, occasions some degree of involvement with religion. Elimination of ex-
19841
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nents of government aid to sectarian institutions, the triumph was
short lived. Walz upheld the principle that church property could
be exempt from state taxation.29 It was a narrow decision, firmly
setting the boundaries of permissible conduct under the establish-
ment clause.30 It added a new test to the analysis and sought to
ensure that clever legislators could not encroach on the verge of
permissible conduct by masking the effects of an aid statute.
After Walz, the Supreme Court ignored the secular purpose
inquiry and emphasized the primary effects and excessive entan-
glement tests."1 In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,32
the Supreme Court analyzed a New York statute that established
financial aid programs for nonpublic schools. The statute created a
plan to reimburse parents for a portion of the tuition paid to pri-
vate elementary or secondary schools. 3 The Court held that the
emption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to
tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct con-
frontations and conflicts that follow in train of those legal processes.
Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indi-
rect economic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement
than taxing them. In analyzing either alternative the questions are whether the
involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official
and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement.
Id. at 674-75.
29. Id. at 680.
30. The majority feared that the wall of separation between church and state was erod-
ing. The excessive entanglement test was a product of this apprehension. For this reason,
many commentators have called Walz a pyrrhic victory for proponents of government aid to
sectarian institutions. The decision affirmed the constitutionality of tax exemptions, but it
also established a new and firmly rooted test that must be met before a statute granting aid
to a religious institution could be deemed valid. See Hunter, supra note 8, at 532; see also
supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
31. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (discussing funds for field trip transpor-
tation); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (examining a statute allowing funds for secu-
lar instructional materials); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (discussing generally the
tripartite test and examining a statute extending auxiliary services to students); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (discussing salary supplements for teachers of secular sub-
jects in religious schools); see, e.g., Note, Statute Granting Tax Deduction for Tuition Paid
by Parents of Sectarian School Children Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 61
WASH. U.L.Q. 269, 276-81 (1983) (discussing the development and application of the exces-
sive entanglement test).
32. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
33. The New York statute established three financial aid programs for private elemen-
tary and secondary schools. The first section provided for direct grants to certain private
schools to be used in maintenance and repair. In order to qualify, the nonpublic school had
to serve a high concentration of students from low-income families. The second section es-
tablished a tuition reimbursement plan for children attending elementary or secondary
schools. The reimbursement was only available to parents with an annual income not in
excess of $5,000 and was limited to a $50 credit per elementary school child and $100 per
high school student. The third section extended financial aid to parents unable to qualify
[Vol. 38:903
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New York statute was unconstitutional; it ruled that the tuition
reimbursements had the primary effect of advancing religion.
3 4
The Supreme Court, analyzing private school tuition reim-
bursements by the state for the first time, emphasized that a state
must maintain an attitude of neutrality. 5 It noted that although
the reimbursement grants were given directly to the parents, the
immediate effect was the same as if the aid had been channelled
directly to the schools.36 By allowing the tax credit, the state re-
lieved parents of part of the financial burden of a private educa-
tion and thus encouraged them to keep their children in nonpublic
institutions. 7 The effect was to indirectly aid sectarian schools.
The Court, in making its establishment clause inquiry, not only
analyzed what the statute purported to do on its face, but also ex-
amined the effects arising from the application of the program. 8 It
focused on the impact of the statute rather than on the legislative
intent or the secular purpose.
During the late seventies, the Court continued to accentuate
the primary effects test and to examine closely the issue of exces-
sive entanglement.39 The primary effects analysis focused on two
factors: the actual impact of the statute and the breadth of the
benefited class. 40 The Court was no longer concerned with either
statements of legislative purpose or with the apparent effects of a
statute. It was instead concerned with a de facto analysis of state
programs and with an examination that would probe the actual ef-
for the tax reimbursement.
34. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783.
35. Id.
36. The Court noted that the fact that the aid was disbursed to the parents rather than
to the schools was only one of many factors to be considered in determining the validity of
the statute. Id. at 781.
37. Id. at 783.
38. The Court's discussion and analysis focused on the effects of providing financial
assistance to the parents, the impact of relieving such taxpayers of a substantial monetary
burden, and the ability of New York to separate the educational and religious educational
functions of private schools. See id.
39. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), the Court analyzed an Ohio statute that
authorized various forms of state aid to nonpublic schools. The aid included textbooks, stan-
dardized tests, speech and hearing diagnostic services, therapeutic guidance and instruc-
tional equipment. The Court upheld the first three programs but argued that the therapeu-
tic and diagnostic services violated the establishment clause because they advanced religion
and created excessive entanglement. The Court emphasized the administrative and bureau-
cratic contacts that these programs entailed and ruled that this was sufficient to invalidate
the aid. Id. at 255.
40. See Note, Tax Deduction for Parents of Children Attending Public and Non-pub-
lic Schools: Mueller v. Allen, 71 Ky. L.J. 686, 687-89 (1983) (discussing the primary effects
test and its application prior to Mueller v. Allen).
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
fects of a statute.4 1 The Court was also preoccupied with the politi-
cal activities of sectarian propagandists and was concerned with
the resulting contacts between church and state.42 It was in this
context that Mueller v. Allen came before the Supreme Court.43
II. Mueller v. Allen
In Mueller v. Allen, the Supreme Court examined a Minne-
sota statute that allowed taxpayers to deduct tuition, textbooks,
and transportation expenses from their state income taxes." These
deductions were available to all parents with dependent children
attending elementary or secondary schools and constituted a de-
duction from gross income. The Court, after analyzing the statute's
compatibility with the tripartite test of Lemon, held that Minne-
sota's tuition reimbursement program did not violate the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment."
The Supreme Court ruled that Minnesota had a legitimate
secular purpose in enacting the statute.4" The majority emphasized
the presumed quality of educational services rendered by private
schools and the legitimate concern of the state in promoting qual-
ity education. 47 The Court acknowledged that states have an over-
riding interest in an educated populace and must thus take steps
to ensure the continued vitality and competitiveness of the private
school system.4 To this end states can enact programs that not
41. See, e.g., Comment, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict In-
terpretation of the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1981) (discussing the
Court's analysis under the primary effects test).
42. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
43. Mueller was also the product of a changing political and economic environment.
Inflation spiraled in the late seventies, thereby increasing the cost of private education. The
high cost of living created a new fervor for tax relief and legislators sought new and innova-
tive ways to reduce the tax burden. The quality of education also became an important
political concern. Advocates of tuition tax credits argued that tuition reimbursements were
an efficient and politically acceptably answer that addressed all three concerns.
44. For a discussion of the Minnesota statute, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
45. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3074.
46. Id. at 3067.
47. The majority argued:
Minnesota, like other states, could conclude that there is a strong public interest
in assuring the continued financial health of private schools, both sectarian and
non-sectarian. By educating a substantial number of students such schools re-
lieve public schools of a correspondingly great burden-to the benefit of all tax-
payers. In addition, private schools may serve as benchmark for public schools,





only promote and foster the health of the overall system, both
public and nonpublic, but that also assist in defraying the costs of
educating the citizenry.49 The majority, cognizant of the rich tradi-
tion of private schools in America, also expressed its reluctance "to
attribute unconstitutional motives to the states, particularly when
a plausible secular purpose for the state's program may be dis-
cerned from the face of the statute.
50
The Supreme Court, turning its attention to the second prong
of the tripartite test, also ruled that the Minnesota statute did not
have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. 51
The majority pointed out that the educational tax credit was one
of many deductions and that the statute also allowed tax credits
for medical and charitable expenses." The Court noted that legis-
latures have broad latitude in classifying and defining tax statutes
and found that the Minnesota legislature had classified its tuition
reimbursement program as a measure of tax relief.8 The Court
said that the legislature's decision to equalize the tax burden and
to reduce the comparative costs of education, both public and non-
public, was entitled to substantial deference.
The Court's primary effects analysis emphasized the breadth
of the benefited class.5" The majority noted that the tuition deduc-
tion was available to all parents5 and that the provision of tax
benefits to such a broad spectrum of beneficiaries was an impor-
tant indicator of the program's neutrality.56 The Court distin-
guished Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist 7 on the
ground that the New York tuition tax credit program in Nyquist
49. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated: "An educated populace is essen-
tial to the political and economic health of any community, and a state's efforts to assist
parents in meeting the rising cost of educational expenses plainly serves this secular purpose




53. Justice Rehnquist noted that prior decisions "consistently have recognized that tra-
ditionally '[l]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinc-
tions in tax statutes,' . . . in part because the 'familiarity with local conditions' enjoyed by
legislators especially enables them to 'achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden.'"
Id. (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 3068.
55. Id. Section 290.09(22), which created the tuition tax credits, extended these benefits
to children in public and nonpublic schools. See supra notes 1 and 44 and accompanying
text.
56. 103 S. Ct. at 3068.
57. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). See generally supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing particularly the Nyquist decision and generally tuition tax credits).
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was available only to parents with children attending nonpublic
schools, thereby conferring special economic benefits to a single
class of citizens.58 The narrow class of beneficiaries under the stat-
ute in Nyquist allowed sectarian activities to be aided directly and
meant that the tax credit had the primary effect of advancing reli-
59gious purposes.
The Mueller Court observed that Minnesota's reimbursement
program served to channel public aid to the parents rather than
provide financial assistance directly to the schools."0 The majority
reasoned that such a distribution was a significant factor in estab-
lishment clause analysis because parochial schools were benefited
as a result of the individual choices of parents and not as a result
of direct state aid.61
The Supreme Court, after determining that the reimburse-
ment program violated neither the first nor the second prong of
the establishment clause test,6" ruled that Minnesota's tuition tax
credit proposal did not lead to excessive entanglement between
church and state." The Court noted that the only aspect of the
program that could lead to impermissible contacts was the text-
book deduction, in that state officials would have to determine
which textbooks qualify for the deduction, but ruled that such con-
tacts were insufficient to invalidate any part of the statute.6 ' The
majority's excessive entanglement analysis was brief and cursory; it
ignored potential administrative contacts stemming from tuition
tax reimbursements.6 5 The analysis also failed to take notice of
58. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3069. In Nyquist, the tuition reimbursement was available
only to parents of children attending private schools, as long as their annual taxable income
did not exceed $5,000. Non-qualifying parents were extended other forms of benefits, in-
cluding direct financial aid. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
59. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3069.
60. Justice Rehnquist argued that "a program, like § 290.09(22), that neutrally provides
assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Es-
tablishment Clause." Id.
61. Justice Rehnquist recognized the insiduous effects of tuition credits. "It is true, of
course, that financial assistance provided to parents ultimately has an economic effect com-
parable to that of aid given directly to the schools attended by their children." Id. He ar-
gued that this was not dispositive of the primary effects issue. Instead, he noted, "[a]ll but
one of our recent cases invalidating state aid to parochial schools have involved the direct
transmission of assistance from the state to the schools themselves." Id.
62. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
63. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3071.
64. Id.
65. The Court did not adequately address the entanglement test issue with regard to
tuition tax credits. Its one-paragraph treatment of the third prong of the tripartite test dealt




ominous political and economic entanglements, as well as of possi-
ble administrative and bureaucratic contacts."
III. AN ANALYSIS OF Mueller v. Allen
A. Secular Legislative Purpose
When a court analyzes whether a secular legislative purpose
exists, it must examine the overt motives and purpose of the state
legislatures that enact the aid statutes." The analysis under the
first prong of the establishment clause test is a threshold examina-
tion that concentrates on legislative statements of secular pur-
pose.6 8 The courts are reluctant to attribute unconstitutional mo-
tives to state legislators.69 As a result, the courts consistently find
that challenged statutes do not violate the secular purpose test.7 0
Minnesota's tax credit proposal, like most tuition reimbursement
statutes, has the overt purpose of furthering secular legislative
goals.71
Drafters of tuition reimbursement statutes are well aware of
and are overtly motivated by, the positive aspects of a nonpublic
education.7 2 The public benefit of private, sectarian schools is not
66. These contacts had long been feared as a potentially troublesome entanglement.
Tution tax credit proponents, for example, are usually adherents of the Catholic faith or of
other Christian denominations. The debate on the subject, therefore, may well be conducted
along sectarian lines. This increases religious tensions and sectarian antagonism. The Court
previously saw such strife as sufficient to invalidate a statute under the third prong of the
establishment clause test. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 784-88; see also supra note 21 and ac-
companying text.
67. See Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
(1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, (1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, (1962); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947); see also supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (discussing the development and
evolution of the secular purpose test).
68. The treatment of the secular purpose inquiry has usually been brief and cursory. As
a general practice, the Court has accepted the "legislative statements of secular purpose at
face value and has not struck down any legislation authorizing aid to nonpublic schools on
this ground." Note, supra note 40, at 687.
69. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of the secular goals of the Minnesota legislature, see supra notes
46-50 and accompanying text.
72. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized this principle. See supra note 47
and accompanying text. Justice Powell once commented on the benefits of nonpublic
schools:
Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided an
educational alternative for millions of young Americans; they often afford whole-
some competition with our public schools; and in some states they relieve sub-
stantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools. The State
1984]
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manifested solely in an overriding concern for religious indoctrina-
tion. Sectarian schools foster civic as well as religious virtue and
promote both religious and nonreligious public involvement. The
schools are concerned with the integral growth of the child; to-
wards that end, they provide stimulus not only for religious and
spiritual growth but also for educational and social development.
The Supreme Court has often emphasized this overriding public
benefit,3 even as it has acknowledged the sectarian nature of such
institutions.7' Such concern with, as well as awareness of, the pub-
lic benefit of a private education allows state statutes that provide
aid to private schools to pass this threshold test of establishment
clause analysis. The Mueller decision is consistent with such
precedents.75
B. Primary Effects Analysis
The Supreme Court's primary effects test is more difficult to
analyze. This test requires a court to look beyond stated motives
and purposes in order to examine the actual impact of the stat-
ute.76 Thus, courts must make a de facto analysis of challenged
state programs rather than simply make a de jure examination."
Such a de facto analysis forces a trier of facts to probe the actual
effects emanating from the application of the legislation rather
than to remain content with discerning the effects apparent on the
face of the statute.
The primary effects test also requires a court to examine the
breadth of the benefited class." States cannot provide aid directly
has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest qual-
ity for all children within its boundaries, whatever school their parents have cho-
sen for them.
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
74. Id.
75. The Mueller decision is also an affirmation of the prevailing social and political
environment. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of the development and evolution of the primary effects test, see
supra notes 17-43 and accompanying text.
77. A de jure analysis is one in which the court looks at the statute and examines
whether the class of beneficiaries is drawn along religious lines. In a de jure analysis the
court will generally examine what is apparent on the face of the statute, rather than delve
into the effects of different state programs. Such an analysis does not examine the applica-
tion of a statute. See Comment, Mueller v. Allen: Do Tuition Tax Deductions Violate the
Establishment Clause?, 68 IowA L. REv. 539, 549 (1983).
78. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973); Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973).
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to the religious institutions but may channel the aid through the
parents. The impact on the school of such indirect aid is more at-
tenuated, masking the discernible effects of the state program.
Financial assistance that is provided to a broad class of taxpayers
is also less likely to inure to the benefit of a particular religious
group. 0 The scope of beneficiaries, though not dispositive of the
primary effects issue, is nonetheless a strong indicator of the actual
impact of a statute. Together with the de facto examination, it re-
quires an analysis of more than one primary or solitary effect and
can thus determine more effectively whether a statute promotes or
inhibits religion."1
A corollary of a de facto analysis is that the religious and secu-
lar impacts of a statute must be separable.82 In Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist,3 the Court held that a New York
tuition reimbursement program violated the establishment clause
of the first amendment because it had the primary effect of pro-
moting religion. 4 The Court said that the state can provide aid to
parochial schools in order to promote secular education but that
there must be a separation between secular and religious educa-
tional functions.8 5 Only in this manner can the state ensure that
"[sitate financial aid supports only the former."80 By providing the
79. See Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3067-70.
80. This is in fact a major reason why the Court emphasizes that the class of benefi-
ciaries must be broad. A broader spectrum of beneficiaries is less likely to be composed
entirely of adherents of one faith, while statutes that narrowly define the recipients of aid
may have the effect of directly aiding a specific sectarian group. See id.
81. In order to determine the primary effects of a statute, a court cannot focus narrowly
on one primary effect. A de facto analysis presupposes that the examining court will delve
beyond a single impact in order to discern all immediate effects. Certainly, some effects are
attenuated and not primary, but the actual impact of a statute is almost always broader
than that envisioned by the legislature in its statement of legislative purpose. That is pre-
cisely the reason why the Court abandoned the secular legislative test as the sole determi-
nant of a statute's constitutionality, and why it developed the primary effects and excessive
entanglement tests. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-80 (1970); Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-49 (1968).
82. For a discussion of this criteria, see Note, supra note 40 at 688-89.
83. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
84. Id. at 779-80.
85. Justice Powell explained:
In Everson, the Court found the bus fare program analogous to the provision of
services such as police and fire protection, sewage disposal, highways, and side-
walks for parochial schools .... Such services, provided in common to all citi-
zens, are 'so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious func-
tion,' . . . that they may fairly be viewed as reflections of a neutral posture
toward religious institutions.
Id. at 781-82 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 783 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
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tuition reimbursement program, New York relieved parents of
their financial burdens sufficiently "to assure that they continue to
have the option to send their children to religion-oriented
schools.
87
Minnesota's tuition reimbursement statute suffers from many
of the same defects that plagued New York's program. Although
the statute allows a deduction for tuition expenses incurred in
public and nonpublic schools, 8 a de facto analysis shows that par-
ents of private school students will claim the bulk of the deduc-
tions.8 The majority of these parents send their children to secta-
rian religious schools, where the line between secular and religious
instruction is often blurred.90 The state, by allowing the tuition
credit, in fact lessens the financial burden of a private sectarian
education. This allows a greater number of parents to continue to
send their children to such religious schools, where they will be
infused with sectarian doctrines. Because the aid to secular and
religious functions are inseparable, such support fails the second
prong of the establishment clause test. It would be impossible, in
administering Minnesota's tuition tax credit program, to target
such reimbursements so they inure solely to the benefit of secular
education. Yet, the Mueller majority found that the state's tuition
tax credits program did not have the primary effect of either pro-
moting or inhibiting religion."'
In Mueller, the Supreme Court failed to make a de facto anal-
ysis of the tax credit program.2 The Court chose to limit the pri-
87. Id.
88. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
89. Justice Marshall, dissenting, argued vigorously for a de facto analysis of Minne-
sota's program. As part of his examination of the application of the statute, Justice Marshall
stated:
Although this tax benefit is available to any parents whose children attend
schools which charge tuition, the vast majority of the taxpayers who are eligible
to receive the benefit are parents whose children attend religious schools. In the
1978-1979 school year, 90,000 students were enrolled in nonpublic schools charg-
ing tuition; over 95% of those students attended sectarian schools. Although the
statute also allows a deduction for the tuition expenses of children attending
public schools, Minnesota public schools are generally prohibited by law from
charging tuition.
Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3072 (J. Marshall, dissenting).
90. Justice Marshall argued that "direct government subsidization of parochial school
tuition is impermissible because 'the effect of the aid is unmistakably to provide desired
financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.'" Id. (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at
783).
91. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3067.
92. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text. In his dissent, Justice Marshall ar-
gued for such a de facto inquiry. He stated that:
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mary effects test to an examination of legislative purposes and to
the scope of the benefited class. It distinguished Nyquist by noting
that the Minnesota statute provided aid to all parents rather than
exclusively to the parents of private school students.93 Such an
analysis ignored two salient principles of the Nyquist decision: the
inability to separate the secular and religious effects94 and the im-
pact of a reduction in the cost of a religious education.95
The Mueller decision narrowed the application of the primary
effects analysis by concentrating on one ultimate effect while ig-
noring all immediate economic benefits.96 The Court thus contra-
vened its own tradition of analyzing the de facto impact of a stat-
ute, opting instead for a de jure examination of Minnesota's tax
credit proposal. 7 Such an analysis also has the ultimate effect of
giving new validity to the secular purpose test. The Court limited
the second prong to an examination of one primary effect, and it
discerned this effect by utilizing the same test employed under the
first prong of the establishment clause inquiry. The majority, after
examining the legislative history and the legislative purpose of the
statute, said that the Minnesota legislature contemplated a general
The only factual inquiry necessary is the same as that employed in Nyquist and
Sloan v. Lemon . . . : whether the deduction permitted for tuition expenses pri-
marily benefits those who send their children to religious schools. In Nyquist we
unequivocally rejected any suggestion that, in determining the effect of a tax
statute, this Court should look exclusively to what the statute on its face pur-
ports to do and ignore the actual operation of the challenged provision.
Id. at 3074 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 3068-69.
94. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, argued that in enacting the tuition tax
credit program, New York failed to "endeavor 'to guarantee the separation between secular
and religious educational functions and to insure that State financial aid supports only the
former.'" Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783. See also supra note 38 and accompanying text. There
are different criteria to determine whether a statute does or does not have the primary
effect of aiding religion.
First, and more important, the type of activity aided must be such that its secu-
lar aspects are 'identifiable and separable' from its religious aspects. . . . Be-
cause parochial schools teach and promote a particular religious faith and are an
integral part of the mission of a sponsoring church, the secular and the religious
aspects of education are inseparable, thus making it impossible to aid only the
secular aspects.
Note, supra note 40, at 688.
95. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
96. In Nyquist, the appellees argued that "primary effect" meant one principal effect.
The Court rejected this argument and stated: "Our cases simply do not support the notion
that a law found to have a 'primary' effect to promote some legitimate end under the State's
police power is immune from further examination to ascertain whether it also has the direct
and immediate effect of advancing religion." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783, n. 39.
97. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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program of tax relief.9" The Court concluded that the primary ef-
fect of the statute was a reduction of the tax burden and found all
other effects were indirect and attenuated." By concerning itself
with only one primary effect, the Court effectively fused the first
two prongs of the establishment clause inquiry, thereby resur-
recting the secular legislative purpose test as a valid part of the
establishment clause analysis.'
C. Excessive Entanglement Test
The Supreme Court, after examining the third prong of the
establishment clause test, ruled that Minnesota's tuition tax credit
proposal did not lead to excessive contacts between church and
state.10 1 But the majority's excessive entanglement analysis failed
to consider important precedent. In Walz v. Tax Commission,
02
the Court considered the issue of tax exemptions and ruled that
the statute granting such exemptions actually diminished the con-
tacts between church and state. 0 3 The Court emphasized that tax-
ing church property exacerbated the contacts between secular and
religious entities by forcing the state to assess religious proper-
ties. 10 4 A tax exemption statute, therefore, diminished the adminis-
trative and bureaucratic relations between governmental and reli-
gious institutions because it proscribed the taxing of religious
property. But tuition tax credits have the opposite effect. Tax
credits engage the state in new assessments and calculations. They
force secular authorities to examine the records of religious schools
and to maintain bureaucratic contacts with sectarian officials.
These effects, unlike tax exemptions, promote greater contacts be-
tween secular and religious authorities and verge on impermissible
98. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3067.
99. Id.
100. The Court employed a de jure analysis to discern the effect of the statute. In doing
so, it emphasized the effects apparent on the face of the statute and weighed heavily the
stated legislative purpose of promoting quality education and providing a measure of tax
relief. Such an analysis necessarily limits the Court in examining the effects of a statute and
accentuates the deference to state legislators that is so pervasive in the secular legislative
purpose test. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Some commentators, in analyzing
the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mueller, argued that a de jure analy-
sis could give undue weight to the secular purpose inquiry. See generally Note, supra note 5
(discussing the decision of the Eighth Circuit and analyzing the implications of a de jure
analysis).
101. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3071.
102. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
103. Id. at 674.
104. Id.; see supra note 28.
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entanglement between church and state.'05
In Nyquist, the Supreme Court emphasized that tuition reim-
bursements have an insidious impact on the broader issue of en-
tanglement. The question of tuition tax credits is an emotional so-
cial issue, one replete with potentially grave and explosive political
questions. The Nyquist Court feared that tuition reimbursements
were politically divisive and intimated that this would suffice to
invalidate the statute under the excessive entanglement test.'0 6
Mueller ignored these potentially onerous political contacts.10 7 In
doing so, the Supreme Court signaled that it was limiting the scope
of the excessive entanglement test. It was not concerned with po-
tential political strife; the Court was restricting its analysis to the
narrower concept of administrative contacts. This not only limited
the third prong of the establishment clause test but also illustrated
a willingness to dwell on apparent and immediate effects at the
expense of broader and equally insiduous contacts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mueller v. Allen is a significant step in the evolution of estab-
lishment clause analysis. For thirty-seven years after Everson v.
Board of Education,"8 the Supreme Court struggled to demarcate
clear and indelible parameters of permissible state action. The re-
sults have been mixed. The parameters have been blurry, not eas-
ily discernible, and often confusing. But they have evolved in a
manner consistent with one overriding principle: a court must ex-
amine the actual impacts of a statute; it cannot be satisfied with
merely probing the intended or apparent effects. 0 9 This mode of
analysis applied to both the primary effects and excessive entan-
glement tests. Because Mueller v. Allen limits the primary effects
test, it creates a sharp and distinct break in the evolution of the
tripartite establishment clause test.
The Mueller decision evidences a Court more deferential to
state legislatures, one more trusting of the overt motives of state
legislators. Mueller also resurrects the secular legislative purpose
test,110 long dormant and inconsequential. It does this not as part
of the first-prong analysis, but by demarcating the clear parame-
105. For a general discussion of permissible contacts see Note, supra note 40, at 689-91.
106. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
107. See id.
108. 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 15-43 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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ters of the primary effects inquiry. The Court discerned the impact
of the statute not by examining the actual effects emanating from
its application but by analyzing the legislative intent and the ef-
fects apparent on the face of the statute. Such analysis portends a
Court less probing in its review of challenged programs and more
limited in its examination of state statutes that grant aid to secta-
rian institutions. Mueller also evidences a Court less demanding in
the area of church and state relations and more tolerant of
breaches in the once impregnable wall.
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